We study capital flows in a panel of 130 countries, and derive the implications for the observed patterns of capital flows and capital controls before and into the crisis of 2008-11. We find that the size of capital flows is positively correlated with country's income level. In addition, capital flight has a non-linear relationship with the income level. Using the Hansen threshold estimation, we identify a three-stage threshold effect: for low-income countries (GDP per capita below US$ 3,000), capital flight increases as the income level rises; and only after the economy passes a threshold level (GDP per capita above US$ 5,000), capital flight declines with income. We conclude with a case study of Brazil and Korea, observing that the decisions to implement capital control measures tend to be pushed around by the feedbacks among economic growth, currency appreciation, and the global financial conditions.
Introduction
This paper provides a detailed investigation on the capital flows in a panel of 130 countries (covering advanced, emerging and less developed countries) over the past three decades. The objective is to compare the patterns and determinants of capital flows, and understand how economic fundamental affect capital flows, as well as the policies directed at capital flows of recent years, i.e. capital controls, especially before and into the crisis of 2008-11. We consider four measures of capital flows: (i) Total capital inflow, (ii) Total capital outflow, (iii) Net capital outflow, and (iv) Capital flight. Firstly, we update the estimates on the capital flows for the 130 countries spanning 24 years from 1980 to 2003. The estimation results show that there are differences in the patterns of these measures of capital flows across developing and industrial countries. Rich countries experience higher volumes of total capital inflows and outflows, and also have higher net capital outflows. Poor countries, which are less open in trade and financial sectors, receive less total capital inflow and experience higher outward capital flight during certain stages of development, especially when their capita income level is relatively low.
Secondly, from both cross-sectional and panel regression estimation results, we find that there is a non-linear relationship between capital flight and economic development. There is an inverse U-shape relationship between capital flight and income level, as measured by GDP per capita. Using the Hansen threshold estimation method, we identify a three-stage threshold effect of economic development on capital flight: below the threshold, capital flight increases as income level rises; Only after passing the threshold level of income, capital flight decreases with GDP per capita. This threshold effect is unique to capital flight and economic development; a similar threshold effect for net outflows, total outflow, and total inflow could not be detected.
Lastly, we look at the cases of Brazil and Korea, both of which are beyond our estimates of the threshold development level. While the concern over currency appreciation and volatility of capital flows continues to be important, the observations on their recent management of capital flows suggest that a country's decision to implement the control measures has become more influenced by the global market conditions especially since the crisis of 2008.
This paper is related to several strands of the capital flow literature. The first explores the driving forces of international capital movements, many of which attempt to establish theoretical models to explain how different factors (i.e. wealth, investment return, risks) affect capital flows. 1 The second studies capital flight, including both theoretical and empirical studies on the definition, measurement and determinants of capital flight. 2 As a special category of capital outflows, capital flight has attracted interests since the 1980s debt crisis in developing countries; due to its distinct nature, the measurements and determinants of capita flight are different from typical capital flows. The third set of literature examines linkages between financial liberalization and international capital movements; a majority of these papers attempt to measure financial openness and explore the effects of financial openness on capita flows, economic growth, and financial crisis. 3 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 overviews the data and methodology for measuring capital flows and capital flight, and reports the patterns of capital flows in a sample of 130 countries, using time-series and 5-year average of individual and groups of countries. Section 3 provides statistical analysis on capital flows. An interesting observation from both cross-sectional and panel data regressions is that capital flight, unlike other types of capital flows, shows a distinct nonlinear relationship with income level (GDP per capita in PPP). To check the robustness of this finding, we also test the non-linear relationship using the Hansen Threshold model. In Section 4, we provide a case study of capital controls of Brazil and Korea. Section 5 concludes. 1 The standard neoclassical models state that capital flows are driven by scarcity, and therefore capital should flow from rich to poor countries. Lucas (1990) points out a paradox to the standard theory: capital flows from rich to poor countries seem small relative to the level predicted by the models. Despite the rapid growth of international capital markets and financial integration, the capital inflows to developing countries remain low compared to the levels observed among the OECD countries. Theoretical and empirical studies offer several explanations to the paradox (see for example Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, & Volosovych, 2008; Gourinchas & Jeanne, 2007; Ju & Wei, 2006) , but the dust has yet to settle. See Jones, Ceolho, et al. (1986) , MilesiFerretti (2002a, 2002b) , Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) , Alfaro and Hammel (2007) , Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) , Verdier (2008) , Devereux and Sutherland (2009), and Wincoop and Tille (2010) .
2 The early use of this phrase is Kindleberger (1938) who defines capital flight as "abnormal flows propelled from a country. . .by. . .one or more complex list of fears and suspicions". According to Kindleberger, a capital outflow should be exceptional, sudden, and arise from adverse, almost pathological expectations for it to qualify as capital flight. The working definition of 'capital flight' was revised by Dooley (1986) , Cuddington (1986) , Lessard and Williamson (1987) , and Cumby and Levich (1987) . See also Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo (1999) and Boyce (2001, 2003) .
3 See Edwards (2005 Edwards ( , 2007 and Edwards and Rigobon (2009) , Evans and Hnatkovska (2005) , Ito (2006, 2008) , Prasad, Rajan, et al. (2007) , Honig (2008) , and Neumann, Penl, and Tanku (2009) . The figure provides a scatter plot of the relationship between capital flows and the level of income for each country. In (a) the Y-axis is the estimated total capital inflow to GDP ratios; (b) the Y-axis is total capital outflow to GDP ratios; (c) net capital outflow and graph. In each graph, the X-axis is GDP per capita, PPP in US dollar. Average data over the period of 1980-2003 are used for 130 countries.
Patterns of capital flows
We examine in details the aggregate capital flows, including: total capital inflow, total capital outflow, net capital outflow and capital flight. Total capital inflow, which is the sum of short-and longterm capital inflows as reported under FDI inflow and portfolio inflow in the balance of payment. Total capital outflow is defined as the sum of short-and long-term capital outflows as reported in the balance of payments; it consists of foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad and portfolio investment outflow. Data on FDI and portfolio investment flows are obtained from the International Financial Statistics (Lines 78bdd and 78bfd for outflow and Lines 78bed and 78bgd for inflow). The dataset covers 130 countries over the period of 1980-2003. Net capital outflow is taken as a current account surplus, obtained from the World Development Indicators. Current account balance is the sum of net exports of goods, services, net income, and net current transfers. A positive figure, or a surplus, implies net capital outflow from and country, and a negative figure implies net capital inflow.
To measure Capital flight, we use the broadest measure-the residual (or World Bank) method. 4 The World Bank method compares the sources of capital (the change in external debt and net foreign direct investment), with the uses of capital (a current account deficit and the change in official reserves). Capital flight occurs when sources of capital exceed uses of finance, hence, the residual: CF = Debt + FI − CAD − FR, where CF is capital flight according to the residual method, denotes change, Debt is stock of gross external debt reported in the World Bank data, FI is the net foreign investment inflows, CAD is the current account deficit and FR is the stock of official foreign reserves. This measure covers all unreported capital outflow, including assets of both the banking and nonbanking sectors. The data used for the calculation of capital flight are taken from various sources. Data on capital flight from developing countries are taken from the World Development Indicators 2005 (WDI), while data from the Source OECD are used for computing capital flight from all the industrial counties and a number of developing countries. 5 We use extensive sources of databases to derive the controlling variables, detailed in Appendix A. While we try to be comprehensive on the data collection across years and countries, the number of observation for each country ranges from 15 to 24 years.
Capital flows & income
Figs. 1 and 2 plot the four types of capital flows as percentage of GDP, by GDP per capita (PPP). As shown in Fig. 1 , the three types of flows, i.e., total capital inflow, total outflow and net capital outflow are all positively correlated with a country's income level. As shown in Fig. 2 , there seems to be a non-linear relationship between capital flight and economic development. We can see more clearly from Fig. 2 panel (b) (after dropping the outlier Kuwait) the inverse U-shape between capital flight and GDP per capital for 129 countries in the sample. This inverse U-shape may imply that there is a threshold effect of economic development on capital flight: below the threshold level of economic development, capital flight will increase as economy grows; until when the economy grows into a stage beyond the threshold level, capital flight will begin to decline. Table 1 provides a detailed comparison between capital flight and capital flows from developing and industrial countries. Average annual capital flight in US$ does not differ much between industrial and developing economies; however, when taken as a ratio to GDP, capital flight from developing countries is almost twenty times of that from industrial countries. On the other hand, normal capital outflow shows an opposite pattern from capital flight: In US$, capital outflow from industrial countries is more than 100 times of that from developing countries. When we consider the effect of economy size, capital outflow as ratio to GDP from industrial counties is still more than 5 times of that from developing countries. In summary, capital flight and normal capital outflow show opposite patterns for industrial and developing countries: developing countries register high levels of capital flight but have low capital outflow, while industrial counties experience large volume of capital outflow and almost no capital flight or even negative capital flight.
Capital flows & financial openness
Two commonly used methods for measuring financial integration are considered. The first is the capital account openness index (KAOPEN) developed by Chinn and Ito (2006) , constructed as the first principle component of the four IMF binary variables in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. It has a wide coverage (more than 100 countries) for a long time period ( . The second measure of financial openness is the Capital Mobility index (Cap Inx) constructed by Edwards (2007) , which combines Quinn (2003) and Mody and Murshid (2002) , and with information from country-specific sources. The two measures are highly correlated, with a correlation of 0.88. Fig. 3 shows the scattered plots of the four types of capital flows to GDP ratio by financial openness for the 130 countries. The X-axis is the KAOPEN (Chinn & Ito, 2006 ) measure of capital account openness. Except capital flight, the size of capital flows is positively correlated with financial openness. The similar patterns can be found using the other financial openness measure.
Capital flows & economic growth
Fig . 4 provides the scatter plots of capital flows by the level of GDP per capita growth. The top row suggests that higher levels of total capital inflows and outflows are correlated with higher economic growth rate. The bottom-left plot shows a negative association: net inflows tend to enter fast growing counties. The bottom-right plot suggests a negative association between capital flight and growth.
Empirical estimation
In this section, we examine the pattern of capital flows formally, controlling for fundamentals and economic openness. The sample includes annual observations for a total of 130 countries, of which 22 are industrial countries and 108 are developing countries, covering the period 1980-2003. The baseline regression models include cross-country OLS estimations using sample averaged data, panel The figure provides a scatter plot of the relationship between the four types of capital flows (capital flight, net capital outflow, total capital inflow and outflow) and the rate of economic growth (GDP per capita). In graph (a) the Y-axis is the estimated total capital inflow to GDP ratios; in graph (b) the Y-axis is total capital outflow to GDP ratios; graph (c) net capital outflow; and graph (d) capital flight to GDP ratios. In each graph, the X-axis is the GDP per capita growth rate. The plots use average data for 119 countries over the period of 1980-2003. estimation using annual data and five-year average data. We add to the literature by checking the non-linear relationships between capital flows and the controls, using the Hansen threshold regression methods.The dependent variables are capital flows to GDP. We use a number of economic controls, including GDP per capita, financial openness, trade openness, education, inflation, growth, real interest rate, currency overvaluation, corruption, political risk, institutional quality. Table 2 reports the correlation matrix of the variables. As shown, capital inflow and outflow are highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.75. Net capital outflow and capital flight are also highly correlated, with a correlation of 0.55. Net capital outflow, total capital inflow and total outflow are all positively correlated with fundamental factors, including income, trade and financial openness, education, political development and other institutional variables. The determinants for capital flight, however, could not be clearly detected in the correlation matrix. Among the controlling variables, multi-collinearity could be an issue as, for instance, GDP per capita is highly correlated with a number of other explanatory variables. In order to avoid this problem, some variables that have a sample correlation with GDP per capita higher than 0.7 are dropped from the baseline estimation.
Baseline estimation
Both cross-country OLS regressions and panel regressions have been performed to test the significance of explanatory variables. One potential problem with developing country data is the possibility of significant measurement error in annual data and business cycle fluctuations. We also construct a panel of non-overlapping 5-year average for each country. Applying this 5-year average panel on all 
where CF i is average capital flows as ratios to GDP, ˛i is a constant (subscript i indicates countries), Y i is the average GDP per capita PPP, a proxy of economic development, and Y 2 i is its quadratic form. Z i is a vector of all other explanatory variables, and ε i is a random error term. Table 3 provides the cross-country regression results. A result that appears to be fairly robust across countries is the effects of GDP per capita and its squared terms are significant in the regressions of capital flight. For the other three types of capital flows, only the coefficients of the GDP per capita terms are significant, but not the squared terms (i.e. the net outflow equation; the squared term are dropped in the other two to increase the degree of freedom), indicating that these types of flows may be linearly correlated with income. Moreover, for regressions on capita flight, the coefficient on the GDP per capita term is significantly positive and the coefficient on the quadratic term is significantly negative. This suggests that the relationship between capital flight and economic development is not linear, but rather an inverse U-shape.
Cross-country regression
An explanation for this inverse U-shaped correlation of capital flight and GDP per capita may be that during the initial stage of economic development, i.e. low level of GDP per capita, the domestic residents are gradually accumulating wealth domestically and abroad, the latter which is the source for both capital outflows and outgoing flight of capital. Capital flight, in particular, is encouraged by unstable property rights, domestic economic and political condition; the domestic residents choose to take their wealth aboard in other safer places. At this stage, inward foreign investment and foreign lending may lead to even higher capital flight. As the economy continues to grow, economic and political conditions improve and better institutions are established, the residents gain more confidence in the domestic economy, and no longer need to put their assets abroad to avoid government control or potential losses from expropriation. Consequently, capital flight may decrease as GDP per capita and economic development has improved. The coefficient on trade openness is positive and significant for all other types of capital flows, but not for capital flight. This suggests that openness may stimulate the size of normal capital flows across borders, but not capital flight. We also test the possibility of a non-linear relationship between trade openness and capital flight; however, the coefficient on the squared term of trade openness is not significantly different from zero. On one hand, trade openness may lead to higher capital flight because it provides easier access to foreign markets, thereby increasing capital flight through the misinvoicing. On the other hand, higher trade openness also indicates a higher level of development in the domestic financial markets, better institutions and investment environment; higher openness may reduce capital flight as holding domestic assets become more attractive. The coefficients of political development are negative for regressions on capital flight and net capital outflows. This suggests that capital flight decreases as a country become more politically open to public and more democratic; dictatorship and autocracy encourage residents to place their wealth abroad to avoid the control from their government. The sign and significance of the POLITY variable confirm with the theoretical hypothesis. Among all the other additional variables, the cross-country regressions show that the economic growth rate is another important factor. In the regression on capital flight, the coefficient of growth rate is significantly negative, indicating that higher economic growth rate reduces capital flight. In the regression on total capital inflow, the coefficient of growth rate is significantly positive, indicating higher growth rate attracts more capital inflows.
Panel estimation
To increase the sample size and the efficiency of estimation, we pool all the annual data and apply the panel estimation. The panels are non-overlapping 5 year averages for each country; using 1980-2003 period, this results in 5 observations for each country. We also include time dummy and country dummy variables in the regressions to control for time effect and country specific effect. The equation we use for the panel regressions is
where the subscript i represents country, and subscript t represents time. CF it is average capital flows as a ratio to GDP; ˛i is a constant country fixed effect; Y it is the average GDP per capita (PPP); and Y 2 it is its quadratic form. Z it is a vector of all other explanatory variables, t is the time effect, and ε it is an error term. Table 4 shows results from panel regression with both time and country dummies. The panel regression results support the results from cross-country analysis. The coefficients of GDP per capita and its quadratic term are consistently significant in the both cross-country and panel regressions. Net capital outflows, total capital inflows and outflows are all linearly and positively correlated with GDP per capita. When both time and country dummy variables are included in the regressions, the effects of the POLITY variable has become weaker, while the effects of trade openness turn negative. Comparing the cross-country estimation and the panel results suggests that the relationship between capital flows and GDP per capita are the most robust.
Threshold regression
From both the cross-country and the panel regressions, the robust non-linearity between capital flight and a country's GDP per capita suggests an inverse U-shape relationship. We examine further by applying the threshold regression (Hansen, 1999 (Hansen, , 2000 . Several points on the threshold estimation are in order. First, it does not require any specified functional form of nonlinearity, and the number and location of thresholds are endogenously determined by the data. Second, it provides an asymptotic distribution theory to construct confidence intervals for the parameters. A bootstrap method is applied to assess the statistical significance of the threshold effects.
We follow Hansen (1999) by using bootstrap procedure to test the null hypothesis of a linear formulation against a threshold alternative. The threshold model assumes the data is generated by
, where y i and q i are observations on the dependent variable and a threshold variable, respectively, and x i is a p × 1 vector of explanatory variables. The threshold variable q i splits the sample into different groups. The threshold model is given by
The model can be written in a single equation form by defining a dummy variable d i ( ) = I(q i ≤ ) where I(·) denotes the indicator function. If we denote x i ( ) = x i d i ( ), the above could be expressed as
where ˇ = ˇ2 and Â n = ˇ1 − ˇ2, which is the threshold effect, allowing all the regression coefficients to differ between sample groups. The proposed solution is to let Â n → 0 as n→ ∞. This can be achieved by holding ˇ2 fixed thereby making ˇ1 approach ˇ2 as n→ ∞. Hansen (1999) also provides an algorithm that searches over the values of using conditional OLS regressions based on a sequential search over all = q i , for i = 1, 2, . . ., n. The procedure also provides the estimates of ˇ and Â. The hypothesis for the threshold test is whether the threshold model is statistically significant relative to a simple linear specification. The null hypothesis describes the simple linear specification and can be expressed as:
As the threshold parameter is not identified under H 0 , we follow Hansen (1999) and use a heteroskedasticity-consistent Lagrange Multiplier (LM) bootstrap procedure to test the null hypothesis of a linear formulation against a threshold alternative. The p values are then computed by a fixed bootstrap method. The x i values are used as regressors and the bootstrap-dependent variable is generated from N(0,ê 2 1 ), whereê is the OLS residual from the estimated threshold model. Hansen (1999) shows that this procedure yields asymptotically correct p values. Note that if the above null hypothesis is rejected and a threshold level is identified, we should test again the threshold model against a linear specification after dividing the original sample according to the threshold thus identified. This procedure is carried out until the null can no longer be rejected.
In testing the inverse-U relationship hypothesis, we use the following threshold model to conduct the cross-country TR regressions:
where CF is the average capital flight as a ratio to GDP, OPENF is the gravity-fitted trade openness, POLITY is the political indicator for democracy and autocracy, and RIR is the domestic real interest rate. GDPPC is GDP per capita (PPP), as the threshold variable to be tested. The focus of this estimation is the threshold effect of economic development on capital flight, and the estimation of the exact threshold value. 
Development threshold & capital flight
The cross-country data are used for threshold estimations because it allows us to divide country into different stage of development according to their average GDP levels without having to deal with the time effects. In addition, Hansen's threshold regression method is suitable for cross-sectional sample or time series, but not panel data. Owing to data availability, some countries are dropped because of incomplete data in one or more of the explanatory variables. Subject to data availability and outliers, the sample for the threshold estimation covers 97 countries.
Results are shown in Tables 5.a and 5.b. Table 5 .a report the likelihood ratio test statistics for the statistical significance of threshold effects as well as their 1000 bootstrap p-value. We find that the test for a single threshold of GDP per capita is significant with a 1000 bootstrap p-value of 0.001. Furthermore, the test for a second threshold of GDP per capita is also statistically significant with a 1000 bootstrap p-value of 0.003. However, the test for a third threshold level is not significant with a pvalue greater than 0.60. These results provide strong evidence that there exist three stages for capital flight in terms of a country's income level. The estimated two threshold levels of income are US$ 2,974.18 and US$ 5,034.49 in GDP per capita (PPP): the countries can then be segregated into three development regimes-36 low income economies, 16 middle income counties and 44 high income economies (including the 22 industrial countries). We also test the threshold effect of trade openness on capital flight, using trade openness as the threshold variable. However, the 1000 bootstrap p-value for trade openness is 0.895 for single threshold, which is far beyond any acceptable significant level. Therefore, the linear relationship between openness and capital flight cannot be rejected. After finding the estimated values for threshold level of income, it is possible to do the separate OLS regressions by the three different regimes respectively. Table 5 .b demonstrates the OLS estimation results for the three groups of countries. We include the economic controls that appear statistically significant in the cross sectional estimation (Table 3 ). The first column is for countries below the first threshold level and the last column is for countries above the second threshold level. For countries in the first stage (low income countries with GDP per capita less than US$ 2,974), the relationship between capital flight and GDP per capita is positive and highly significant; while for countries in the third stage (high income countries with GDP per capita over US$ 5,034), the relationship is negative and statistically significant. For countries in the second stage, there is no strong and clear relationship between capital flight and the economic development. These estimation results confirm the hypothesis of the nonlinear relationship between capital flight and development threshold, based on the capital income level.
In the threshold regressions, three additional determinants for capital flight are also included, namely openness, polity and real interest rate. According to the coefficients in Table 5 .b, real interest rate is negatively correlated with capital flight only for countries in the first stage. In the second and third stages, real interest rate does not influence capital flight. Polity reduces capital flight in the first and third stages but not for countries in the second stage (between approximately US$ 3,000 to US$ 5,000 in GDP per capita), where the effect is the opposite. In terms of trade openness, it is positively correlated with capital fight in the second and third stage of development. Therefore, for countries in different stage of development, the economic fundamental that could encourage or reduce capital flight are not the same.
Development threshold & net capital outflow
In order to test if the inverse U-shape is unique for capital flight, we also conduct the threshold regressions on net capital outflow using income and trade openness as the threshold variables. The same cross-sectional data for 97 countries are used for the estimation. Table 6 .a presents the estimation results on the threshold effects of GDP per capita and trade openness. The estimation results point two threshold effects of GDP per capita, but not for trade openness, based on the bootstrap p-value at the significant level of 10% level for single threshold and for second threshold. The estimated threshold GDP per capita levels are US$ 3,911 and US$ 14,427. Table 6 .b presents the OLS regression results of net capital outflows for the three economic development regimes. For countries with GDP per capita below US$ 3,911, trade openness is positively associated with net capital outflows, while income, real interest rate and polity are all insignificant. For countries with GDP per capita between US$ 3,911 and US$ 14,427, none of the variables explains net capital outflows. For countries with GDP per capita over US$ 14,427, not only the variables are highly significant, but they also take the expected signs. In all the three stages, net capital outflow is always positively correlated with GDP per capita. This is the opposite of the pattern observed on capital flight, which is negatively associated with the threshold income levels. Except capital flight, the other types of capital flows (i.e. capital inflows, capital outflows, and net flows) are mostly linearly associated with GDP per capita. Hence, the inverse U-shape in the relationship of capital flows and income level is quite unique to capital flight. 
Robustness checks
To examine the robustness of our baseline findings (cross section and panel of 5-year averages), we first estimate the panel regressions using annual data. Although there could be considerable noise and measurement error in annual data, particularly for developing countries, it is nevertheless useful to examine the sensitivity of the results to the choice of data frequency. Using the annual data, we re-estimate the panel regressions with time and country effects. Using the sample set of economic controls, Table 7 presents the results, which can be directly compared to the baseline estimation in Tables 3 and 4 . Evidently, the results emerging as qualitatively robust are the positive effects of economic growth and financial openness, while the positive effect of GDP per capita on capital flows is significant throughout. (10) and autocracy (−10). RIR is the annual domestic real interest rate. *** Significant at 1%. Subject to data availability, the panel is not balanced. We include dummy variables for each time period and also for each country to control for time and country specific effects. Dependent variables are the capital flight, net capital outflow, total capital inflow and total capital outflow to GDP ratios. Explanatory variables include: GDPPC is GDP per capita, PPP. GDPPC2 is the square term of GDPPC. OPENF is the gravity model fitted trade openness. POLITY is the political rating of democracy (10) and autocracy (−10). RIR is the annual domestic real interest rate. INF: Annual domestic inflation rate, consumer prices (annual %). KAOPEN is the Chinn-Ito measure for capital account openness. OVAL is exchange rate over-valuation. GROWTH is the annual GDP per capita growth rate. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%.
Serial correlation may influence the regression on panels. We next include a lagged term of capital flows as an additional explanatory variable; with CF it−1 representing the lagged capital flows:
As shown in Table 8 , the coefficients of the lagged terms are all significantly positive across capital flow equations, suggesting the important of persistency in capital flow adjustment on the annual basis. Adding these lagged terms does not affect the importance of GDP per capita, economic growth, and financial openness.
Financial turbulence, capital flows, and control measures
In this section, we offer a case study of two emerging markets. Based on the latest statistics from World Bank, the GDP per capita of Brazil is US$ 7, 990 (in PPP) on foreign banks' borrowing dollars from abroad (i.e. to discourage swapping dollars borrowed abroad for Korean won). The measure had a significant effect on foreign banks' cross-border claims on banks in Korea during the second and third quarters of 2007. 7 While the control seems to have some intended effect, shortly after Korea was hit by sharp capital outflow and currency depreciation due to a mounting concern over its large private external debts, amplified by the onset of 2008 global crisis. These periods are also marked by a huge volatility of capital flows, particularly the outflows, the level not seen since the crisis of 1998, as shown in Fig. 7 .
As growth returns in 2009, foreign capitals surge into Korea again. Korea imposed on November 19, 2009 restrictions on banks' foreign exchange transaction to tighten its control over foreign currency liquidity at local banks to make them less vulnerable. The measure is followed by limits on banks' currency forwards trades on June 9, 2010; profit tax on foreigners' investment to curb capital inflows on October 19, 2010; new regulations on equity derivatives trading on January 11, 2011; prohibit financial companies from buying locally issued foreign-currency bonds for domestic use (to temper the resurgent won and reduce short-term foreign debt) on July 19, 2011; plans to impose taxes on the earnings of overseas investors from foreign currency bonds sold in the country in its latest effort to curb rising short-term external debt and counter capital inflows on September 7, 2011.
The experiences of Brazil and Korea highlight the challenge of managing capital flows in the era of financial globalization. The economies of Brazil and Korea are by now a distance beyond many other emerging markets in terms of their economic development and openness. While the capital flight is no longer the threat to these two countries, the volatility of foreign capitals, both inflows and outflows, still does. The difficulty has to do with the speed that foreign capitals are moving in and out of the country. As the evidence of Brazil and Korea shows, the decisions to implement capital control measures tend to be pushed around by the feedbacks among economic growth, currency appreciation, and the global financial conditions.
Conclusion
We report cross-sectional and panel estimation results of capital flow patterns controlling for a number of economic development variables. The variation of capital flows across time and countries is significantly associated with a country's income level as measured by GDP per capita. Capital flight has a unique non-linear relationship with the income level. Using the Hansen threshold estimation method, we identify a three-stage development threshold effect of income level to determine the cutoffs of GDP per capita that affect capital flight across countries. Based on a case study of Brazil and Korea, both of which are beyond the threshold development level, we study their recent management of capital flows and find that a country's decision to implement the control measure may appear fickle and depends on the global market conditions, especially since the crisis of 2008. 
